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Race: Judgment Summary: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

THE

PROSECUTOR V.
J

the complexity of the proceedings, (3) the conduct of the parties, (4) the conduct of the authorities, and (5) the prejudice to
the accused. In conducting this analysis, the Appeals Chamber
found that since this case was one of the largest ever heard by
the Tribunal, it was not unreasonable to expect a long process.
It also determined Mugenzi's claim that the Prosecution failed
to properly investigate and assess the weakness of its evidence
to be unsupported. Further, the Chamber found that Mugiraneza
had failed to demonstrate that his inclusion within the larger
case resulted in prolonging his trial. Nor was it convinced that
organizational failings or other judicial or trial management
activity caused undue delay in the case proceedings. Finally, it
rejected the notion that the accused had suffered prejudice as
a result of the delay. As a result, the majority of the Appeals
Chamber dismissed Mugenzi and Mugiraneza's claims that the
Trial Chamber violated their right to trial without undue delay.
Judge Robinson wrote a separate, partially dissenting opinion in
which he concluded that the almost three year lapse between the
closing arguments and issuance of the Trial Judgment breached
the appellants' right to a trial without undue delay. According
to Judge Robinson, this delay directly resulted from the judges'
workload and concluded that "[w]hen delay results from the
manner in which the Tribunal has organized and managed its
resources, it is no answer to a claim of undue delay that the exigencies of the Tribunal's work dictated that course, if the claim
for undue delay is otherwise well-grounded."

MUGENZI AND MUGIRANEZA, APPEALS
CASE No. ICTR-99-50-A

DGMENT,

On February 4, 2013, the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued
its judgment in the case against Justin Mugenzi and Prosper
Mugiraneza. On September 30, 2011, the Trial Chamber found
Mugenzi and Mugiraneza guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide and of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
In the same judgment, the Trial Chamber acquitted Mugenzi's
and Mugiraneza's co-accused, Casimir Bizimungu and J6r6meCl6ment Bicamumpaka. Both Mugenzi and Mugiraneza were
sentenced by the Trial Chamber to thirty years imprisonment.
Despite denying Mugenzi's and Mugiraneza's claims that their
right to a fair trial was violated, the Appeals Chamber reversed
the Trial Chamber's judgment and acquitted both accused.
Both Mugenzi and Mugiraneza advanced several grounds
of appeal - eighteen and seven, respectively - challenging
their convictions and sentence. Among the grounds for appeal
submitted by both men was a claim that their right to a fair trial
was violated because of alleged undue delay. In all, the period
between Mugenzi's and Mugiraneza's arrest on April 6, 1999
and the pronouncement of the Trial Judgment was twelve years,
five months, and twenty-four days.
In Mugenzi's appeal, he argued that the Trial Court erred in
concluding that the delay in his case could be justified by the
size and complexity of the proceedings. Instead, Mugenzi argued
that the delay was a result of: (1) the organizational failures of
the Tribunal, (2) its treatment of his claims of delay during
pre-trial proceedings, and (3) the inflated indictment advanced
by the Prosecution because of its improper investigation and
assessment of evidence. He also stressed the prejudice he suffered because of the time he was forced to spend away from his
family and his inability to access witnesses. Mugiraneza argued
that the Trial Chamber did not adequately consider the length of
time between the closing arguments of the case and the issuance
of the Trial Judgment, a period of almost three years. According
to Mugiraneza, this delay was directly attributable to the fact
that some of the judges were staffed on multiple cases at the
same time and that the United Nations' completion strategy for
the ICTR had affected staff retention, thereby slowing the work
of the Tribunal. Additionally, similar to Mugenzi, Mugiraneza
argued that the complexity of the case was due to the volume of
evidence, much of which was irrelevant to his individual case.
He also claimed that his twelve-year incarceration amounted to
prejudice and a violation of his right to pre-trial release.

In addition to their contention that the undue delay violated
their right to a fair trial, both Mugenzi and Mugiraneza argued
that the Prosecution violated Rule 68 of the ICTR's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, which provides that the Prosecution
"shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the Defense any material, which, in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor, may
suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or
affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence." In response, the
Appeals Chamber agreed that the Prosecution had violated its
disclosure obligations by failing to disclose exculpatory material
that emerged in other cases being tried before the ICTR during
the time that the case against Mugenzi and Mugiraneza was
ongoing. However, the Chamber did not find that these failures
materially impacted the ability of Mugenzi and Mugiraneza
to prepare their defense. Thus, although the Appeals Chamber
reminded the Prosecution of the fundamental importance of its
continuous obligation to disclose under Rule 68, it dismissed the
Defense's claim that the disclosure violation violated the right of
the accused to a fair trial.
After addressing the appellants' fair trial challenges, the
Appeals Chamber turned to their challenges against their
convictions, beginning with the convictions for conspiracy to
commit genocide. The Trial Chamber found both men guilty
of this charge based on their roles in the removal of JeanBaptiste Habyalimana, a Tutsi, from his role as the prefect of
Butare Prefecture on April 17, 1994. At the time, Mugenzi
served as the Minister of Trade and Industry in the Interim

In its consideration of the arguments of Mugenzi and
Mugiraneza, the Appeals Chamber began by reiterating that
the ICTR Statute guarantees the right to be tried without undue
delay in Article 20(4)(c). It also recalled that claims of undue
delay have always been decided on a case-by-case basis. In order
to assess the particular arguments made by the appellants here,
the Appeals Chamber assessed: (1) the length of the delay, (2)
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Government and Mugiraneza served as the Minister of Civil
Service. According to the Trial Chamber, both accused, acting in
concert with other members of the Interim Government, made
the decision to remove Habyalimana from his post with the
intention to "undercut the real and symbolic resistance the Tutsi
prefect posed to the targeted killing of Tutsi civilians inhabiting
Butare." The Chamber also considered evidence suggesting that
Habyalimana had effectively obstructed the killing of Tutsis
in Butare Prefecture and that, after his removal, these killings
"rapidly increased and became more widespread." On this evidence, the Trial Chamber found that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza
possessed genocidal intent when making the decision to dismiss
Habyalimana and thus convicted them of conspiracy to commit
genocide.

Finally, the Appeals Chamber addressed the appellants' challenges to their conviction for direct and public incitement to
genocide, which was based on their participation in a ceremony
to install Sylvain Nsabimana as the new prefect of the Butare
Prefecture on April 19, 1994. During this ceremony, Interim
President Th6odore Sindikubwabo delivered a speech calling for
the killing of Tutsis, which the Trial Chamber determined was
made for the purpose of inciting genocide. The Trial Chamber
then determined that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza "possessed the
same genocidal intent held by Sindikubwabo," relying in part
on the fact that they participated in the decision to remove
Habyalimana as prefect two days before and that they attended
the ceremony installing Nsabimana. The Trial Chamber also
cited to evidence suggesting that they knew of the content of
Sindikubwabo's speech before it was delivered. On appeal,
Mugenzi and Mugiraneza challenged the Trial Chamber's finding that they acted with the requisite mens rea. Once again, the
Appeals Chamber agreed, finding that the Trial Chamber erred
in "concluding that the only reasonable inference that could
be drawn from the evidence on the record is that Mugenzi and
Mugiraneza knew that Sindikubwabo's speech at the ceremony
would be aimed at sparking the killing of Tutsis and that, therefore, their presence at the ceremony demonstrates their shared
genocidal intent." In support of this conclusion, the Appeals
Chamber stressed that there was no direct evidence that Mugenzi
and Mugiraneza met with Sindikubwabo immediately prior to
the ceremony, nor was there any other direct evidence of "preplanning." Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial
Chamber's convictions. Based on its decisions overturning the
convictions of Mugenzi and Mugiraneza in their entirety, the
Appeals Chamber ordered the immediate release of both men.

On appeal, Mugenzi and Mugiraneza argued, inter alia, that
the Trial Chamber erred by "failing to properly consider other
relevant circumstantial evidence that demonstrated the absence
of genocidal purpose in Habyalimana's removal" The Appeals
Chamber agreed, reiterating that, where a conviction for genocide is based on circumstantial evidence, guilt must be the only
reasonable inference available from the evidence. Here, the
Trial Chamber had been presented not only with the evidence
it cited in support of its finding of genocidal intent, but also
with evidence that Habyalimana was removed from his post for
"administrative reasons" and/or on the basis of his purported ties
to the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which was fighting the Interim
Government at the time of his removal. While the Trial Chamber
acknowledged these alternative explanations and dismissed
them, a majority of the Appeals Chamber found that these explanations presented additional reasonable conclusions that could
be drawn from the evidence. Thus, the Appeals Chamber, with
Judge Liu dissenting, overturned the Trial Chamber's convictions. Judge Liu wrote a dissenting opinion expressing his view
that that Trial Chamber "carefully considered and reasonably
rejected the alternative explanations advanced by the Defense
for the reasons behind the decision to dismiss Habyalimana from
his post," disagreeing with the Appeal Chamber's majority's
decision overturning the conspiracy convictions.

Written by Megan Race, afirst-year law student atAmerican
University Washington College of Law, and edited by Katherine
Cleary Thompson, AssistantDirectorofthe War Crimes Research
Office.
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